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Serving as an Outside Director

by Murray L. Weidenbaum
Serving as an outside director can be an
absorbing challenge because it involves
balancing three important aspects of the
role-representing the interests of the
shareholders, making a contribution to the
company, and maintaining professional independence. It would be presumptuous of
any one person currently serving as a corporate director to state exactly how these
three factors should be balanced by each
outside director.
The way in which anyone works out the
three aspects of the director's role must depend on the nature of the company, the
problems and opportunities that it faces,
and the composition of the Board itself.
Therefore, I will limit this article to my personal experiences, mainly explaining how I
view my task in the several Boards that I
serve on. Perhaps these thoughts will encourage other directors, with different and
broader backgrounds, to present their ideas
on the subject.

The Role of the Outside Director

First of all, I believe that it is clear that
the directors of a corporation represent its
stockholders. That certainly should be true
Dr. Weidenbaum is Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor and Director of the Center for the Study
of American Business at Washington University in St.
Louis. He serves on the boards of several major companies. This article originally appeared in Directors &
Boards, Winter 1984.

of independent outside directors. I am a
member of the traditional school who does
not believe in constituency directors. Thus,
I do not view my position as representing
56-year old male Republican college professors from Missouri-or any other group
that I happen to belong to, other than the
shareholders of the company.

Ralph Nader has proposed national elections
for Board members of major companies.
I would propose as a start electing
the members of the rubber-stamp Board
of his conglomerate.
Although I do not represent any special
interest, I do feel free to contribute the
special expertise that I have. In my case, it
is economics. But if government wants to
regulate companies and influence their
behavior, they will have to do it from the
outside, and certainly not via this director.
I know that Ralph Nader has proposed national elections for Board members of major companies. If he is so enamored of the
idea, I would propose as a start electing the
members of the rubber-stamp Board of his
conglomerate. My candidate is former Interior Secretary, James Watt! But, until
then, I suggest that the allegiance of directors to the shareholders who elect them is
fundamental.
How do you represent the shareholders at
the meetings of the Board? Personally, I try
to follow a variation of the Socratic method.
I mainly ask questions. Of course, I try to
avoid second-guessing the management. A
company does not benefit from either a
totally compliant Board nor from one that
tries to dominate the management. My attitude is that a strong management is
cultivated by providing some guidance to it.
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If the company has that type of management, asking the right questions may be
sufficient.
If the management seems too dense to get
your message, the company may have the
wrong management-or you may have been
too subtle. But if you really get a brush off
on something you consider important,
speak to the other directors. There is
nothing like introducing a well-prepared
motion to get the chairman's attention.
In any event, the director needs to exercise discretion in carrying out the role. If
you are asking questions on every item on
the agenda, you are probably becoming a
nuisance and diluting your effectiveness.
But, if meeting after meeting goes by and
you do not open your mouth-except to
second the motion to adopt the minutesthen you probably are not earning your director's fee.
Often, outside directors will be expected
to draw on their particular expertise. If an
acquisition is being considered, an investment banker-or the Chief Executive Officer of another company-may point out
some of the unexpected problems that
could arise. A consideration of the sales
forecast may benefit from the economist
commenting on the business outlook. The
review of international activities can be a
useful point at which a banker on the
Board discusses the foreign exchange situation. None of this should be aimed at replacing the role of the internal management
and staff, or to be competitive with them. It
is more a matter of providing another or at
least broader viewpoint.
Relations with Management
The interactions with the CEO are vital
for the outside director. The subtlety of the
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relationship arises particularly because of
the presence of other members of the
senior management on the Board, the "inside" directors. The outside director must
remember that the CEO-chairman (assuming that the customary dual title obtains)
has to deal on a day-to-day basis with the
other inside directors in a leadership
fashion.
Thus, I often find it useful to communicate ideas or concerns to the Board
chairman in an informal way. He is not put
on the spot. (By the way, I am not being
sexist; it is just that I have never served on
a Board with a female chairwoman.) Of
course, if I am not satisfied by the Chairman's response, I feel free to raise the matter at a Board or committee meeting. But,
especially on touchy matters such as personnel, at least I have put him on notice.
Much can be written on the limits to the
director's role. Though much as it may be
tempting, outside directors should refrain
from taking on management's responsibilities. One of the more frequent opportunities-which I always decline-is to answer calls from reporters inquiring about
some aspect of company policy or operations. In what invariably turns out to be a
very short interview, I tell them that in no
way will I act as a spokesman for the company or even talk about the organization.
Any question about the firm should be directed to the management.

Serving on Committees

The matter of Board committees is of
special importance. Much of the work of
the Board is performed in those smaller
groups. The Audit Committee is, in effect,
the watchdog of the corporation. The Nominating Committee is initially responsible for
what may be the Board's most basic function: providing for the succession of top
management, and also for naming new directors. The Compensation Committee is
concerned with providing proper incentives
for performance. In each of these areas, it
seems clear that independent outside directors are required, at least in large proportion, for the proper performance of the
task. In the case of the Audit Committee,
the regulations of the New York Stock Exchange limit membership to independent
outside directors.
More balanced mixes of inside and outside directors, on the other hand, may be
useful in the case of other committees such
as Finance and Public Policy. Especially if
it is charged with the review of potential
acquisitions and other major investments,
the Finance Committee needs the institutional knowledge of key inside directors. A
similar situation occurs in the Public Policy
Committee. The outside directors may be
particularly knowledgable about the external social and political environment facing
I would caution against the type of
Executive Committee that is so dominated
by insiders and long-term outsiders that it
becomes, in effect, a senior management
operating committee.

Of course, I am generally available to
answer calls about economic trends and
other business policy matters unrelated to
the specific companies on whose Board I
serve. But those calls always come on other
occasions.

the company. But the inside directors know
the actual interactions with government
and public interest groups.
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The Executive Committee, in contrast, is
generally dominated by inside directors.
They have the expertise and also the time,
in the case of the executive committees that
meet frequently. However, I would caution
against the type of Executive Committee
that is so dominated by insiders and longterm outsiders that it becomes, in effect, a
senior management operating committee,
and not an arm of the Board itself. To be
sure, in practice each company may have
its own variation of the composite or typical committee structure that I have just
described. Some Boards may prefer fewer
committees while other Boards may desire
for their members to be involved in other
matters.

balance the pressures for dividends and retained earnings. Often many shareholders
emphasize the short-run benefits of increased income, while management is more concerned about investing in the company's
future growth. Also, the officers may simply
find it easier or at least more satisfactory
to use retained earnings rather than going
to the credit markets. For the typical business firm, this is not an either-or choice,
but a case of balancing two important and
basic considerations.
Although I share the prevailing view that
the Board should consist primarily of outside directors, I must report an uncomfortable feeling. I know of no comprehensive
analysis that demonstrates that the performance of companies with outside-dominated Boards is superior to that of companies relying primarily on management directors. Perhaps that simply reflects the
fact that, to my knowledge, nobody has undertaken such a study. In any event, there

The "mixed" Board provides a built-in
opportunity to balance the pressures for
dividends and retained earnings.
Clearly the corporate Board of Directors,
both in plenary sessions and acting through
its committees, deals (or at least it should)
with the issues that are fundamental to the
future of the organization. Perhaps that is
the ultimate justification for maintaining a
Board with both inside and outside directors. The non-employees bring a detachment
(I always hesitate to say objectivity) to the
task, while the insiders bring to bear a unique understanding of the firm-its people,
internal working relationships, customers
and supplier dealings, and often rich institutional knowledge. Also, the outside directors are given an opportunity to meet,
work with, and observe in action those
members of the senior management who
may be considered for the top slot in the
future.
Another value of the "mixed" Board is
that it provides a built-in opportunity to
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I know of no comprehensive analysis that
demonstrates that the performance of companies with outside-dominated Boards is
superior to that of companies relying
primarily 011 management directors.
is no shortage of anecdotal information
about the shortcomings of specific companies with mainly inside directors-such
as paying top management far more generously than other companies in the industry whose performance is superior in
terms of sales and profitability.

The Independence of the Outside Director

In any event, it would seem clear that, for
the outside director to exercise effectively
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the role of objective overseer of corporate
activity, he or she truly has to enjoy a position of independence. In judging the quality
of independence, I find legal requirements
and definitions useful but not ultimately
satisfying.
Of course, it is important to avoid technical, i.e., legal conflicts of interest-such as
an officer of a major supplier or customer
serving on the Board. Yet I find that independence must be broader than that.
Thus, I find myself in opposition to the suggestions that are made from time to time to
provide such generous fees, and supporting
staff, that the director can devote a very
substantial portion of his or her total professional time to the role.
I believe that directors should be adequately compensated and should take the
task seriously. The economist in me urges
awareness of competition, in this case in
the market for quality directors. Yet, I oppose those proposals because they would
tend to give the director too great a financial stake in holding on to the job. Thus,
one of my personal tests of a truly independent outside director is how important is
the income from Board service to him or
her.

thought to the loss of director's fees because remuneration from that Board service was not an important part of my total
income.
Nevertheless, I do not believe that a company is an eleemosynary institution. Director's fees should be in alignment with responsibility, time spent, and comparability.
But clearly much of the income is psychic
or otherwise non-financial. How else do you
explain a $1 million a year CEO serving on
a Board of another company?

The New Director

To be specific, I served on the Board of
one company whose key policies I came to
disagree with strongly. After raising the
issue at Board meetings and not obtaining
support from other members, I decided not
to run for reelection. Given my preferences
in working relationships, it was a very quiet
departure. Yet I did so without giving any

What advice can be given to the new
member of a Board of Directors? All I can
report is the attitude that I have tried to
take when joining a Board-that I will have
to learn a lot before hitting my stride. That
learning process covers the company's activities and history, its people, and especially the variety of formal and informal interactions with the other members of the
Board.
Although it may go against the grain, I try
not to assume that the firms that I was
previously affiliated with always followed
the right approach, and that any departures
from that path by this company whose
Board I have just joined is wrong or at best
merely backward. Easier said than done, of
course.
To the new director, I would urge you not
to feel obliged to say more than "Hello"
and "Thank You" at your first or second
Board meeting. You can learn a lot by
listening- and looking at the interactions
among the various Board members and
with the management representatives. To
belabor the obvious, that is why teachers
like to use the blackboard. The visual aid
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One of my personal tests of a truly independent outside director is how important is the
income from Board service to him or her.

reinforces the oral lecture. It is more effective to rely on two senses rather than merely on one. Do not be shy about asking some
questions, but avoid those that you can
answer yourself by looking up the
company's annual report or filings with the
Securities and Exchange Commission.

is little that can formally be prescribed,
other than to be conscious of the need to
maintain an environment conducive to the
exercise of those key values.

Concluding Thoughts

Finally, I raise the often painful subject
of Board turnover. I do not view a directorship as a type of civil service appointment.
It should not become a sinecure. To be
sure, there are important benefits to the
company from having members whose longevity provides a wealth of background and
experience with the company-sometimes
in excess of that of the current top management. Yet, there may be the danger of longtime directors becoming so accustomed to
the existing way of doing business that they
viscerally oppose innovation on the oldest
bureaucratic grounds: "We have never done
it that way." Also, the needs of a company
may change-with shifts in its markets,
product line, regulatory status, and external
environment.

I do not view a directorship as a type of
civil service appointment. It should not
become a sinecure.
All this, of course, underscores the need
for relying on such eternal values as judgment and balance in the selection and retention of corporate directors. Although this is
hardly a startling conclusion, and it may
sound pedantic, I have never found good
judgment to be in excess supply in any
organization that I have been connected
with, public or private. In any event, there
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